INTRODUCTION
This definition provides the starting point for this discussion.
Why was this? First, even by the late 1960s, environmental policy constituted an extremely minor aspect of EU affairs; EU environmental policy was not formally initiated until 1972
and did not really start in earnest until the early 1980s. There was, therefore, very little EU 1 As this paper is mostly concerned with events in England, and, to lesser extent, Scotland and Wales, I
use the term 'Britain' rather than United Kingdom.
environmental policy on the statute books in 1972 that could conceivably Europeanize
Britain or indeed any other member state. Environmental issues did not, for instance warrant a single mention in the Government White Paper on EEC membership, published in July 1971.
Second, there was a very widely shared view that British policy was inherently better than the policies of continental states or anything that the EEC might conceivably produce. Aside from a very small number of radical environmentalists, "the issue [of membership] was seen essentially to do with joining a trading bloc" (Lowe and Ward, 1998, 11) . By the early 1970s, Britain had amassed plenty of experience about how to achieve its 'non' domestic environmental concerns (e.g. the survival of endangered species such as tigers and elephants, as well as migrating birds) (ibid., 9) by working through international bodies such as the UN.
Therefore, most British environmentalists assumed that if EEC membership had any environmental implications (the widespread view was that on balance it would not), the dominant flow of influence would run the other way i.e. from Britain to the other member states.
However, these initial expectations of very minimal Europeanization proved to be spectacularly wide of the mark. Thirty years after Britain formally joined the EU, almost all national environmental policy is made by, or in close association with, EU environmental policy. Furthermore, the EU is now regarded as the dominant source of environmental policy initiatives and the most significant 'external' force on British environmental policy, which 4 far outweighs even the combined influence of the UN and the OECD. British environmental groups and British businesses have altered the locus of their lobbying activities accordingly.
This attempts to do four main things: identify the traditional features of national policy prior to the EU's involvement; describe the main phases of British-EU relations (i.e. the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s) ; pinpoint the main changes in domestic thinking and practice which can be causally related to the EU's involvement; consider what the story of Europeanization in this particular sector reveals about the common themes raised by Bache and Jordan (forthcoming) The remainder of this paper is structured around these four main questions. Thus, Section
Two describes what British environmental policy looked like prior to the EU's involvement.
This provides a simple analytical baseline upon which subsequent changes are mapped. As this book is primarily concerned about the Europeanization of national policy and politics, the baseline used differentiates between the content, structures and style of national policy.
These three features are presented as being analytically distinct, but in practice, they are often subtly interrelated. Following Hall (1993) , the content of national policy is divided into three different sub-aspects or 'levels'. The first comprises the overall goals that guide policy.
These goals operate within a policy paradigm or a 'framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing' (ibid.: 279).
The second covers the instruments or techniques by which these policy goals are attained, e.g. direct regulation, fiscal instruments, or voluntary agreements. Finally, the third level measures the calibration of these policy instruments, e.g. the level of an emission standard or tax, etc.
National structures meanwhile, range from formal bureaucratic organizations with staff, budgets and buildings, through to more informal phenomena such as codes, conventions and other socialized ways of looking at the world (Peters 1999: 28, 146) . This paper seeks to cover both aspects i.e. the basic building blocks of the state (i.e. the 'machinery' of government: departments, agencies, formal relations between national and sub-national layers of government, etc.), through to the norms and rules (both formal and informal) that govern the operation of its constituent parts. Finally, the section on the style of national policy draws upon what Richardson originally described as society's "standard operating procedures for making and implementing policies" (Richardson et al. 1982: 2) . By that, he meant: (1) the dominant approach to problem solving, ranging from anticipatory/active to reactive, and (2) the government's relationship to other actors, characterized by their inclination either to reach consensus with organized groups or to impose decisions.
Having constructed this baseline, Section Three then briefly describes the historical evolution of national and EU policy. Then, Section Four identifies how the EU has affected the content, structure and style of national policy. Finally, Section Five investigates what the events in the environmental sector reveal about Britain's role in Europe and Europe's growing involvement in British affairs.
THE TRADITIONAL FEATURES OF NATIONAL POLICY

6
The dominant style of national policy Voluntarism, discretion and practicability are the words that are commonly used to described British environmental policy prior to the EU's involvement (Weale, 1997) . Weale et al. (2000, 180-181) believe the national policy style embodied a strong commitment to cooperation, administrative discretion and technical specialization. Thus, as new problems emerged and became important, new laws were enacted and new agencies put in place to administer them. As it was sold to foreigners by British politicians (Waldegrave, 1985) , "the British approach" was predominantly reactive rather than anticipatory, tactical rather than strategic, pragmatic rather than ambitious, and case-by-case rather than uniform. In practice, it amounted to a 'trial and error' search for the most cost effective (i.e. to business) solutions to policy problems.
It is fair to say that it was not just born of the need for political expediency. Influential and independent policy elites genuinely believed that 'muddling through' problems was inherently superior to strategic, long term planning, which they viewed as being far too abstract and too rigid (Ashby and Anderson, 1981) . This attitude of mind sprang from the British legal system (which relies heavily on common law with its constant interplay between precedent and interpretation), its informal and constantly evolving constitution, and the widespread desire to optimise pollution rather than minimise waste emissions regardless of their environmental impact (see below).
Pragmatic opportunism has traditionally gone hand in hand with a particular style of operating, which has been described as informal, reactive, gradualist and accommodative. In 7 operational terms, the regulation of environmentally damaging activities proceeded on the basis of courteous negotiation between polluters and regulators operating in exclusive policy communities of experts (what Weale et al. 2000 : 181 term 'club government').
The main structures of national policy
At the dawn of modern environmental policy in 1970, Britain had some of the oldest and most innovative policy structures in the world. In 1863, the UK created the first industrial permitting agency in the world, known as the Alkali Inspectorate (which has since been merged into the national Environment Agency -see below). In 1970, it also created the Department of the Environment), which at the time, was the very first environmental ministry in the world Although these structures of government have changed since 1970, their guiding philosophy has remained largely unchanged. This philosophy holds that central government should only ever set the broad legislative or policy framework, leaving the detailed aspects of policy finetuning and implementation either to specialist agencies such as the Alkali Inspectorate (see above) or to local bureaucrats working in local or regional government. Compare this with the EU, in which the EU institutions develop highly specific policy proposals, which are they passed down to the national level to be implemented. Unlike MEPs, British MPs played very little part in determining the detailed content of environmental protection policies; although 8 they passed the necessary framework legislation, the task of implementing was devolved to more specialist agencies operating well away from the public gaze.
Finally, the legal structures of environmental policy (i.e. a mixture of statute and common law; no environmental court or tribunals, or a constitutional commitment to environmental protection) are consistent with Britain's common law traditions, its unwritten constitution and consensual policy style (very few legal disputes ever reached court).
The content of national policy
It is actually quite difficult to identify an overall philosophy or paradigm of British policy other than that pollution should be optimised by limiting its effects in the environment rather than reduced at source (Weale et al. 2000: 177; Jordan, 2002) . One influential assessment of British practice (Lowe and Flynn, 1989) concluded that British policy was in fact little more than a pragmatic "accretion of common law, statutes, agencies, procedures and policies".
Traditionally, the underlying principle of policy has been that standards should be 'reasonably practicable' i.e. tailored to reflect local conditions and circumstances, the economic costs of abatement and the current state of technical knowledge (Jordan, 1998: 180-1) . This approach was assumed to be more effective and more economically efficient than forcing all polluters to attain the same (i.e. harmonised) statutory standards. This pragmatic, case-by-case approach (see above) was staunchly defended by different parts of the scientific and political establishment in Britain (Ashby and Anderson, 1981; Waldegrave, 1985) .
Britain was reluctant to set long term policy goals, especially whose achievement could not be guaranteed. The preference instead was for targets to be negotiated incrementally between industry and technical agencies. The 'technology forcing' element of German policy has never really taken root in Britain. Where long term goals were set, they tended to be associated with distinct geographical areas (i.e. they were EQOs or EQSs), as opposed to the emission limits favoured by continental European states.
In terms of the policy instruments used, regulation was generally preferred to taxes, subsidies and the kind of sectoral covenants that began to appear in The Netherlands, France and Germany in the 1970s. Crucially, British regulatory instruments were somewhat different to those used in continental European states and the EU. Whereas the latter preferred fixed legislative standards and deadlines to ensure comparability of effort and simplify the process of monitoring and enforcement, Britain usually opted for unwritten agreements with polluters, general legal guidelines and standards, and flexible implementation systems, which could be tailored to suit political and financial exigencies (see above).
Summary
These three aspects fitted closely together. Thus the allocation of task between the main structures reflected the dominant style and the 'contextual' paradigm of British policy (see below), the finer details of which could not possibly have been worked out by civil servants working at desks in London or Cardiff. Close, secretive collaborative relationship provided an effective means of making the subtle trade offs required to optimize pollution. As a rule, regulators working in specialised agencies preferred not to set standards which could not be complied with.
There are several other features of national environmental policy and politics prior to 1973 that stand out. First, the British tended to view 'environmental policy' in slightly narrower terms than other industrialized northern European states. British policy prior to the EU's involvement was thus narrower than the norm, insofar as it focused on a small sub-set of environmental concerns i.e. those that were predominantly human health related or were associated with governing a relatively crowded island state sharing no land borders with others states (e.g. heritage and landscape protection, land use planning and nature conservation).
Second, British elites were extremely 'proud' of these arrangements (Hajer, 1995) . Some used the supposed superiority of British protection systems to argue against any EU involvement in environmental standard setting. In the late 1970s, the DoE (1978) claimed that it was already "at a comparatively advanced stage of development and adoption of environmental protection policies," the implication being that the Commission's help was not required. This organizational assumption was shared by many influential members of the political establishment, who genuinely believed that national policy had achieved "a superior level of fitness, through 160 years of our own history" (Ashby and Anderson 1981: 513) .
Before the main aims of EU environmental policy had even been agreed by the European Council, the DoE informed the European Commission that it should not invest too much time in designing common policies, because Britain was "well placed to cope with its own environmental problems" (in Evans, 1983, 43 pollution. Crucially, while the former required detailed and intensive intra-EU collaboration, the latter could (and, Britain believed, should) be pursued through international or local means. In a sense, then, Britain and the rest of the EU were set firmly on the path to conflict.
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF BRITISH POLICY: A SHORT HISTORY The 1970s: small beginnings
Conflict did indeed very quickly surface when the Commission issued specific regulatory proposals. A proposal issued in 1974 to reduce the emission of dangerous substances to water triggered a very deep conflict. A Directive (which contained extensive exemptions for Britain), was only agreed in 1976 after much wrangling. This episode soured British-EU environmental relations for years to come. Part of the problem was that the British did very little to upload its policies to EU, therefore the Commission tended to base its thinking on other countries' priorities (Jordan, 2002: 31-2) . There were, of course, areas where the DoE successfully took the initiative in Europe -or at least supported European solutions (e.g. the Birds Directive, the 1981 Regulation on whales and the 1975 Directive on waste) but they were far "fewer than might have been expected of a country with such a well established environmental policy" (Haigh, 1984: 302) . Instead, Britain tried to steer EU environmental policy from the margins by blocking policies that misfitted with its settled domestic traditions. Extensive state ownership and/or sponsorship of key polluting industries such as water, energy and farming, provided Whitehall with many strong, short-term economic reasons to resist the environmental investments demanded by more ambitious states such as
Germany and the Netherlands. When EU policies were adopted, the DoE tried to mask their impact by relying upon administrative implementation mechanisms such as circulars rather than primary or secondary legislation.
The creeping Europeanization of national policy did not, however, trigger much societal debate. The only group which seemed at all aware of what was happening were law lords.
Very early on, the House of Lords select committee on the European communities issued a detailed report that sought to the EEC's growing competence in areas (such as the environment) that did not sit with its formal remit. Their Lordships believed that "the… transfer of sovereignty should be defined and the Community should keep within its powers", because it "causes an irreversible removal of legislative power from [Britain]" (HOLSCEC, 1978, 16, 17) . Interestingly, not one witness -not even the DoE -could say precisely how much legislation had been adopted thus far, or assess what its impact had been. By the mid-1980s, Britain was markedly out of step with the rest of Europe, weighed down by a very poor environmental reputation, and in dispute with many important domestic environmental actors such as the HOLSCEC, the RCEP and even traditionally 'insider' pressure groups such as the RSPB. Neutering Europeanization by attempting to block and/or subvert key directives not only conspicuously failed to close the misfit, but also lumbered Britain with a reputation for being 'the Dirty Man of Europe.' Gradually, Britain began to experience more and more of the political crises that plague those states that persistently download policy from the EU. In Britain's case, the crises arose when EU polices escaped from the narrow confines of the 'environmental' parts of the DoE and began to intrude into 14 much more politically important areas of its core business, principally water and later energy privatisation (Jordan and Greenaway, 1998 Germany are now to be heard complaining that recent EU policies have a "distinctly British flavour" (Wurzel, 1999: 128) .
HOW MUCH EUROPEANIZATION HAS OCCURRED?
The style of British policy
The style of British environmental policy in Britain
There are two aspects to policy style: the style of British policy in Britain, and the style of the British in the EU. The style in which contemporary British environmental policy is enunciated and implemented is undeniably very different to that described above i.e.
consensual and reactive (Jordan and Richardson 1982: 81; Richardson and Watts 1985) . We have already noted the secular trend towards greater explicitness, more formalism and greater pro-action. 
The British policy style in the EU
To a large extent, the British have carried this style of working into Brussels (Christoph 1993) . The British like to think that they are hard negotiators but dutiful implementers of EU legislation (Wallace 1997) . British negotiators also believe they inject a dose of administrative common sense, while other, supposedly more 'European' states, slip into an 'easy rhetoric' about the merits of European integration (Wallace 1995: 47) . The British have successfully advocated the use of a more consultative and bargained style of working, using white and green papers, as well as broader, framework directives, and economic appraisal techniques.
In other respects (and particularly during the early years of EU membership), the British were forced to adopt a new and somewhat more adversarial policy style in order to resist the demands made by other, more pro-environment states and the European Commission.
However, on many occasions, it was left looking distinctly 'awkward' and antienvironmental. In fact, some commentators have gone as far as to suggest that many of Britain's European problems stem not from substantive inter-state differences, but contrasting styles of bargaining and coalition building (Buller 1995; Wallace 1995) . For a variety of reasons (see above), the British find it immensely difficult to speak the language of Europe integration. Essentially, they see it as a zero-sum game played between sovereign states. Consequently, they still tend to spend more time trying to defend a fixed national position in the Council (a task to which the highly polished but inflexible inter-departmental coordination mechanisms are ideally suited), instead of employing more subtle negotiating tactics to create broad alliances or shape the all-important 'pre-negotiation' stages of the policy process.
There are, however, signs that the British have started to learn a new, much more communautaire policy style in Brussels, especially since Tony Blair's election in 1997.
Labour's politically more engaged stance has made it easier to work inside the EU political system to upload policies, than when John Major was Prime Minister. Interestingly, the unexpectedly deep and politically painful Europeanization of environmental policy had forced the DoE to adopt this more 'European' style already in the early 1990s, i.e. well before the arrival of Blair. This shift was made mainly for pragmatic reasons -the department realized that it had to get a firmer grip on EU policy, or risk many more policy misfits. Being more proactively engaged, meant uploading more policies to Brussels, using more communautaire language ('yes, but' in response to Commission proposals rather than an unequivocal 'no') and engaging in more 'corridor diplomacy' (Jordan 2002 ) to achieve its departmental objectives. In making these changes, the DoE has transformed itself into one of the most European departments in Whitehall (Buller and Smith 1998 ).
Summary
To conclude, the national environmental policy style in Britain today is more consultative and more anticipatory than it was in 1973. EU membership is of course deeply implicated in this change but there are many other, more important forces behind it. However, it is clear that the EU has: (1) created a more explicit and transparent framework of environmental protection, reinforcing the trend towards a more open and transparent policy style; (2) generated much more environmental information, which has made it easier for environmental NGOs to mount legal challenges to government decisions as part of a gradual shift towards a more adversarial policy style; (3) in many key areas (e.g. acid rain, marine pollution, ozone depletion etc.) made British policy considerably more anticipatory; (4) forced British negotiators to adopt a more informal and negotiated policy style in order to secure British interests in Brussels.
The structures of British policy
Legal structures
The impact of the EU is probably most clearly inscribed on legal structures (Macrory 1987; 1991) , which have become more formalized and much more specific in terms of the overall objectives to be achieved. In fact, national law was probably one of the first elements of British life to be Europeanized, although the overall extent still came as a very great surprise (Nicol 2001) . As in other member states, British government and politics were extremely slow to adjust to the rapid and largely unforeseen 'transformation' of the EU legal system (Alter 2001: 183) . Indeed, throughout the 1970s, central government acted deliberately to reduce the depth of change by employing administrative circulars rather than secondary legislation to implement EU rules. This practice had to be discontinued following adverse rulings by the ECJ. Of course, the written word of EU law also has to be interpreted and implemented by national enforcement bodies. Therefore, any assessment of the Europeanization of legal structures must also include the concomitant effects on the overall style of national policy making, which are discussed more fully below.
Governmental structures
It is considerably harder to identify a clear 'EU effect' on other national structures. The most obvious changes include the creation of a permanent representation (UKREP) in Brussels, 20 the creation of some new regulatory agencies (e.g. the National Rivers Authority), the establishment of a European co-ordinating unit in the DoE, the appearance of new procedures to secure agreement across Whitehall, and the creation of parliamentary committees to oversee the executive's activities in the EU (Bulmer and Burch 1998; Kassim 2000; 2001a/b) . However, these are relatively modest impacts. If anything, the characteristic features of policy making in Whitehall remain essentially undiminished. The 'Rolls Royce' system of inter-departmental coordination still operates much as it always has. Westminster has developed new procedures to scrutinise the Whitehall departments, but they are strikingly similar to those governing national policy. EU pressures also contributed to the need for parliamentary reform (e.g. the creation of select committees) (Giddings and Drewry, 1996) , but they were certainly not the sole cause (Rasmussen 2001: 158) .
However, those who have looked in much greater detail at the Europeanization of organizational cultures suggest that the EU has made some Whitehall departments more 'European' in their attitudes and expectations (Buller and Smith 1998) . Research reveals that the DoE has indeed 'learnt' new, more communautaire tactics, established new alliances and, most profoundly of all, adopted a new (i.e. more environmental and more European)
'departmental view' (Jordan 2002) . Rather puzzlingly, Europeanization has strengthened the hand of the DoE within Whitehall battles, even though it did not consciously act to secure this outcome.
Central-local relations
Turning to the relationships between central and local government, Nigel Haigh's (1986) thesis that EU Directives have centralized power in Britain is still extremely apposite, but it needs to be seen against the backdrop of a series of important domestic and international drivers of change. So yes, it is true that the logic of European integration has shifted more policy making from local levels up to Whitehall and the EU, thereby eroding the power of 
The content of British policy
Policy goals and paradigms
In terms of policy paradigms, the EU has forced Britain to adopt a more preventative, sourcebased policy paradigm. The need for change first arose in the long and acrimonious battle to 22 agree the 1976 Dangerous Substances Directive (see above). No sooner had this philosophical conflict been delicately resolved, than a similarly bitter conflict erupted over the application of emission limits (this time enshrined within the principle of best available technology (BAT)) to acidic gases. This time Britain was forced to compromise in the teeth of concerted opposition from other states. In the course of these and other battles (e.g. the dumping of waste at sea), the EU made the objectives of national policy more environmentally ambitious, specified the instruments to be used to achieve them, and even the manner in which they should be applied.
There are, however, three reasons for rejecting the simple view that the EU has forced Britain to adopt a more precautionary, source-based paradigm of policy making. Second, the depth of change varies greatly across the various sectors of British environmental policy (Lowe and Ward 1998: 290) . So, for example, air, noise, water and chemicals policy now follow the EU's preference for strong source-based controls, whereas land use planning and biodiversity protection still (though by no means exclusively) reflect the traditional, contextual approach of gradually negotiating targets, rather than specifying a priori some absolute level of environmental protection.
Finally, it is debatable whether the pre-existing British approach was ever a paradigm in the sense of a narrow, confining cognitive framework (Jordan and Greenaway 1998) . It is probably more accurate to view it as a set of politically and economically expedient activities, which were only worked up into a broader 'philosophy' by British officials seeking to justify the status quo to the EU (c.f. Haigh 1989: 22) . In other words, we could say that for a time, Europeanization exacerbated the paradigmatic differences between British and EU policy, leading, temporarily, to a period of retrenchment.
Policy instruments
In terms of policy tools, the EU has led directly to the adoption of more source-based controls, as well as more formal environmental quality standards for certain air and water pollutants. These reflect the EU's preference for more harmonized and precautionary based policies. However, for reasons that are widely known, the EU's toolbox is still predominantly regulatory (Jordan et al. 2003) . Consequently, domestic and international drivers provide the dominant source of pressure behind the recent appearance of 'new'
environmental policy instruments such as voluntary agreements and eco-taxes (Jordan et al. 2003) .
24
The calibration of policy instruments
The precise calibration of policy instruments has been clearly and very directly affected by the EU. The EU has created many new emission standards, tightened existing ones and formalized their achievement by setting strict deadlines. The style in which instruments are calibrated has also changed, as has the structural context in which the calibration takes place.
In the past, the ability to constantly fine-tuning of policy instruments to reflect local needs and circumstances was highly prized by local technocrats. Their freedom to manoeuvre has decreased dramatically as more and more standards are set within the EU. This trend has eroded the administrative discretion of local officials, who have lost much of their ability to 'create' policy 'bottom up' in Britain.
Summary
In summary, we can say that the EU has: (1) helped to erode (but not completely overturn) the contextual policy paradigm by enunciating precise, source-based standards and deadlines;
(2) changed the objectives of British policy by exerting a strong, upward pressure on domestic environmental standards and accelerated the pace of remedial work; (3) introduced many more precise objectives and timetables; (4) brought Britain into contact with new instruments and influenced the manner in which it applies existing tools; and (5) forced
Britain to adopt completely new tools such as air quality standards and emission 'bubbles'.
Two other points are worthy of note. First, the EU-effect is most obvious in relation to the selection and calibration of policy instruments, reflecting the EU's main function which is to develop and disseminate regulatory standards (Lowe and Ward 1998: 291-2) . The EU's 25 ability to secure paradigm changes is much more indirect. Rather, the EU operates much more as an institutional mechanism through which greener member states can export a more precautionary paradigm to other parts of Europe.
Second, the broad pattern of policy shaping and/or taking has been shaped by the pre-existing content, style and structure of British policy. Thus, British exports to the EU have tended to be related to the more structural elements of policy, i.e. matters of process and machinery such as implementation (IMPEL), EPI (the Cardiff process), IPPC and subsidiarity. By contrast, in the 1980s the Germans pushed targets relating to emissions (e.g. acid rain),
technology (e.g. BAT) and production (e.g. packaging waste). Similarly, Britain has been better at uploading policies and/or ideas in areas where it has national expertise (e.g. biodiversity) (Fairbrass and Jordan 2001a/b) or which developed concurrently with EU policies (e.g. waste) (Porter 1998) .
CONCLUSIONS A new British environmental policy?
The last thirty years have arguably witnessed the appearance of new forms of environmental policy making in Britain. In terms of the content of national policy, there is a more consistent and formal system of administrative control based upon fixed standards and timetables of compliance, rather than administrative rules of thumb. There are many more source-based, emission controls, and a greater desire to enunciate the underlying principles and objectives of control such as precaution, prevention or sustainability. Policy makers are also more willing to experiment with non-regulatory instruments such as environmental taxes 26 and, more recently, tradable permits (Jordan et al. 2003) . In terms of policy structures, powers have shifted from local regulators to officials at higher (e.g. EU) levels of governance, and new coordinating structures have been created. Finally, the style of environmental regulation is more transparent with greater public involvement. The most marked change is to be found in the regulation of public utilities such as energy and water, which are now regulated at arms-length from government, by non-departmental public bodies.
However, the overall process of change has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Thus, if we look at the content of many policies, there is still a strong attachment to informal Richardson's schema, the style of British environmental policy is still overwhelmingly consensual rather than adversarial (i.e. administrative discretion continues to prevail over judicial interpretation) (see below). It is also remains predominantly reactive.
How much domestic change is Europeanization?
Not all of these changes are, of course, driven wholly or even partly by the EU. with far fewer inflexible timetables, non-negotiable targets and explicit standards.
To conclude, therefore, the 'EU-effect' is most clearly inscribed upon the content of national environmental policy. Its effect on national policy structures and policy styles has been heavily modulated by domestic factors, though the EU remains an important trigger of national action and a constraint upon the autonomy of national actors pursuing 'domestic' policy objectives.
Forms and modes of Europeanization
Bache and Jordan (forthcoming) hypothesized that Europeanization could adopt four distinct forms (voluntary direct/indirect and coercive direct/indirect). On balance, it is probably more meaningful to try and slot individual items of policy into their 2x2 matrix, rather than allocate the whole sector into one or more cells. That said, over time, Europeanization in this sector has gradually changed from being a predominantly externally opposed process (i.e. coercive) to being much more voluntary in its basic nature. This shift corresponds to the changing way in which Britain -defined broadly to include the lead department (the DoE), as well as British MEPs, environmental and business pressure groups -interacts with EU environmental policy making i.e. from negative policy 'taking' to a much more proactive form of policy 'making' in Europe.
With hindsight, the British clung to the 'British approach' to environmental problem solving too doggedly believing it was innately better to anything and everything developed on the continent. Instead of selling the model (or 'approach') to the rest of the EU, Britain chose instead to dig its heels in and actively resist innovations proposed by the EU. Very little sustained effort was put into uploading policies to Brussels. In so doing, Britain suffered the fate of those that consistently download policy from the EU -namely implementation problems, policy misfits, and performance crises (Green Cowles et al. 2001: 8-9) . Therefore, although it was never originally pursued for environmental reasons, Britain's membership of the EU has nonetheless transformed national environmental policy in highly unexpected and profound ways.
'Winners' and 'losers'
Who have been the main winners and losers to emerge from the Europeanization process?
Europeanization has undoubtedly altered and empowered the DoE. Through its engagement with EU policy making, the DoE has altered its internal management, its tactics and, most radical of all, its very identity and political interests. Its bargaining power in Whitehall has grown, not directly (because decision making authority has shifted up from the British Cabinet to the much more pro-environment Environment Council) but indirectly as the external discipline of implementing EU rules have forced the DoE to intervene in the work of and win battles against powerful cognate departments. Ironically, the DoE initially set out to thwart Europeanization by forestalling any European integration in this sector. It would have been a less environmental and a much less powerful department today, had it succeeded in this endeavour (Jordan, 2002) .
Europeanization has also greatly empowered national environmental groups, offering them a higher authority to which they can now appeal (Lowe and Ward 1998: 295 example, access to information, EIA and bathing water quality, the EU has also helped to produce and disseminate much more detailed environmental information to pressure groups and the public. In all these different respects, Europeanization has helped to accelerate the shift in Britain towards what Weale (1992) has termed a "new" and much more openly conflictual politics of the environment.
Thus far, Europeanisation has created two main losers: national parliament (which struggles to audit policy making in Brussels) (Armstong and Bulmer 1996: 275; Giddings and Drewry 1996) and local-level technocrats who used to work in closed policy communities.
Europeanization has greatly circumscribed their professional discretion and influence.
Europeanization: conflicting interpretations
Broadly speaking, this book adopts a top down approach to understanding Europeanization.
At a very general level, it is possible to understand the Europeanization of British environmental policy in top down terms. A top down explanation would emphasize the determining influence of the deep-seated misfit between the model of environmental protection pushed by continental states and the Commission, and the one preferred by island member states such as Ireland and the UK. On this view, this produced an underlying source of adaptational pressure i.e. Britain was destined to struggle to cope with the evolution of EU environmental policy regardless of its fraught political relationship with the rest of. The last thirty years could, therefore, be portrayed as one long struggle to overcome the first mover disadvantage of having innovated earlier and differently to other pioneering EU states. The
British approach (that is the pre-commitment to externalize waste into the sea and the air, and carefully optimize pollution by carefully negotiating with affected interests), was, in fact, doubly disadvantageous: not only was it different to continental models, but it could not easily be uploaded to other states, which had similar legal systems and shared many policy problems arising from their much stronger geographical affinity.
However, subsequent events do not fit so neatly into this way of thinking. For example, some have argued that notions of 'fit' and 'misfit' are sometime inaccurately presented as though they can easily be read off from a 'snap shot' comparison of national and EU policy.
In fact, in this sector 'fit' proved to be a constant and recursive process of interaction between many different sub-elements of 'policy' and also activities at different levels of governance (Dyson and Goetz: 2003) . Thus, European integration generated common policies that Europeanised national political systems, which in turn altered the domestic circumstances in which national actors formed their national preferences during subsequent rounds of negotiation. The British state struggled to anticipate, let alone control, these processes and in the end, was subtly transformed. Having therefore once been a reluctant 'taker' of policy determined in Brussels, the deep and politically painful Europeanization of national policy (Jordan 2002; eventually forced Britain to take positive steps to 'shape' EU policy in its own image. This gradual, temporal shift and the recursive interactions between different levels of governance, is difficult to squeeze into a simple top down model Second, the misfit concept may even blind the observer to the possibility that national policies may even be re-defined in response to adaptive pressure from the EU. In the case of UK environmental policy, some have convincingly argued (Lowe and Ward, 1998 ) that that the "British approach" was never as coherent or as logically set out as it is in section Two.
They argue that it "came to be defined in reaction to the incursions of EC environmental policy." They continue: in "emphasizing Britain's distinctiveness… the differences with the Community's approach were stressed to the point of caricature, and a coherence and commitment was claimed for British practices and procedures -that was not entirely warranted" (Lowe and Ward, 1998, 18-19) .
This raises a third general problem with top down approaches: they tend to overlook the many ways in which fits and misfits are socially constructed by non-state actors. These actors either (as in the case of the Commission) seek to recover ground lost at the negotiation stage or (as in the case of national groups) adapted themselves to exploit the new political opportunities created by EU policy implementation. These opportunities included the formal
